Abstract. An intrusion detection system usually infers the status of an unknown behavior from limited available ones via model generalization, but the generalization is not perfect. Most existing techniques use it blindly (or only based on specific datasets at least) without considering the difference among various application scenarios. For example, signature-based ones use signatures generated fi-om specific occurrence environments, anomaly-based ones are usually evaluated by a specific dataset. To make matters worse, various techniques have been introduced recently to exploit too stingy or too generous generalization that causes intrusion detection invalid, for example, mimicry attacks, automatic signature variation generation etc. Therefore, a critical task in intrusion detection is to evaluate the effects of model generalization. In this paper, we try to meet the task. First, we divide model generalization into several levels, which are evaluated one by one to identify their significance on intrusion detection. Among our experimental results, the significance of different levels is much different. Under-generalization will sacrifice the detection performance, but over-generalization will not lead to any benefit. Moreover, model generalization is necessary to identify more behaviors in detection, but its implications for normal behaviors are different from those for intrusive ones.
Introduction
There exist two general approaches for detecting intrusions: signature-based intrusion detection (SID, a.k.a. misuse detection), where an intrusion is detected if its behavior matches existing intrusion signatures, and anomaly-based intrusion detection (AID), where an intrusion is detected if the resource behavior deviates from normal behaviors significantly. From another aspect, there are two behavior spaces for intrusion detection (Figure 1 ): normal behavior space and intrusive behavior space, and they are complementary to each other. Conceptually, SID is based on knowledge in intrusive behavior space, and AID is based on knowledge in normal behavior space [2] . Perfect detection of intrusions can be achieved only if we have a complete model of any one of the two behavior spaces, because what is not bad is good and vice versa ideally. model falling into the normal behavior space leads to the inaccuracy. Due to incompleteness, the intrusive behavior model cannot cover all intrusive behavior space, and the normal behavior model cannot cover all the normal behavior space either. In SID (Figure l .a), model inaccuracy will lead to false positives (FP) and model incompleteness in it will lead to false negatives (FN). In contrast, model inaccuracy in the normal behavior model will lead to FNs and model incompleteness in it will cause FPs (Figure l
b). To build a practical intrusion detection system, it is critical to reduce the model inaccuracy and incompleteness, and thus to lower FPs and FNs in the detection phase.

P a s t addressings.
To make up for the incompleteness, most existing 'model building' techniques try to infer the unknown behaviors via model generalization (defined in Section 3), which is able to eliminate FNs in SID and to reduce F P s in AID. However, as indicated in Figure 1 , it can also lead to more FPs in SID and more FNs in AID. In other words, model generalization is twoedged for intrusion detection in principle [9] . Various techniques have been introduced recently to exploit too stingy or too generous model generalization {Section 2), for example, mimicry attacks[ll], mutate exploits [10] , automatic signature variation gencration [7] etc.
Evaluation. Thus, it is very useful to identify the utility of model generalization. We can envision at least four of its applications.
Determine deployment conditions for an intrusion detection technique, as well as proper techniques to detect intrusions into a specific environment. Guide the development of an adaptive intrusion detection technique by adjusting the generalization extent. Alleviate concept drifting. Intrusion and application evolution patterns can determine the extent of generalization in an ad hoc deployment. -Perform intrusion detection evaluation. According to different generalization extents, we can generate appropriate artificial datasets, which can identify the generic detection capability of a SID/AID technique.
Our contributions. Wc believe that our evaluation advances the research on intrusion detection in two perspectives. First, we design a framework to evaluate the effect of model generalization, in which model generalization is achieved at different levels according to the reasonableness of the imderlying assumptions. Secondly, on a typical datasct, our experiments are performed to verify the evaluation framework, and to identify the utility of model generalization.
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The remaining parts are organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work on model generalization. In section 3, an evaluation framework for model generalization is designed. As a case study, experiments in section 4 reveal the implications of model generalization on intrusion detection. Lastly, we draw conclusions and lay out the future work in section 5.
Related Work
To our knowledge, we are the first to evaluate model generalization for intrusion detection while there are two existing implicit applications of model generalization: extending behavior models and evade detection.
First, the intrusion signatures can be generalized to cover more intrusion variations. Anchor et al.
[1] applied the evolutionary programming to optimize the generahzation in an intrusion signature, and thus to detect more intrusion variants. Rubin et al. [8] presented a method to construct more robust signatures from existing intrusion signatures. Secondly, the normal behavior model of AID can be generalized as well. In [5, 12] , existing audit trails are modeled inexactly to accommodate more behaviors, and thus to achieve model generalization.
Several work is proposed to utilize the false negatives introduced by model generalization. In AID techniques, mimicry attacks [11] are designed to misuse the generalization by mimicking its normal behaviors, and thus to avoid being detected. In SID techniques, model generalization is also exploited [10, 7] to generate intrusion variations, which cannot be detected either.
In summary, too generous generalization in AID will make mimicry attacks successful [11] , while too stingy generalization in SID will make some attack variations undetectable [8, 10] . In our research, we try to identify the relations between the extent of generalization and detection performance.
An Evaluation Framework for Model Generalization
In this section, we proposed the evaluation framework for model generalization based on a theoretical basis for intrusion detection [6] .
Theoretical Basis for Intrusion D e t e c t i o n
In a nutshell, the basis introduces three new concepts to formalize the process of intrusion detection: f e a t u r e range, NSA l a b e l and compound f e a t u r e . Every instance in a training audit trail can be represented as a feature range of a highorder compound feature, and every feature range has a NSA label, which is used to detect behaviors in test audit trails. In detail, the value of every feature in an instance can be replaced with a feature range, which is gotten by extending its value so that the extension does not conflict with other existing values. The feature ranges of all features are compounded using cartesian products to build a (training or test) behavior signature for intrusion detection.
In this framework, it is supposed that there is a training audit trail and a feature vector FV = {Fi, F 2 , . . . , F^} . For every feature F^, a series of feature ranges R]p , R^ , . . . , R^ is first mined from the training audit trails. Using feature ranges of all features, the behavior signatures Sigi,Sig2 -• • ,Sigi are constructed for intrusion detection. In the detection phase, a test instance is formahzed as a signature Sigt, and it is detected in accordance with whether it matches any existing behavior signature.
M o d e l Generalization
We first define model generahzation within the context of intrusion detection.
Definition 1 ( M o d e l Generalization). Suppose that there exists a set of behaviors associated with a resource. Model generalization is an operation that tries to identify a new behavior associated with the same resource based on the existing set of behavior instances.
Model generalization can improve the detection rate by identifying more novel behaviors (e.g., normal behaviors) but may also degrade the detection performance by mis-identifying novel behaviors because of generalization errors [9] . This influence of model generalization on detection performance is generally determined by its underlying assumptions per se. In our evaluation, we first pinpoint three phases of our framework where we can use various assumptions to apply three levels of generalization, and then evaluate them one by one for model generalization. We also include a level without any generalization in which the behaviors in the training audit trails are represented precisely.
In the follow-up subsections, we describe the methods to evaluate the three levels of generalizations which moves the model from most specialized to most generalized as we move down the level (from LO to L3).
LO W i t h o u t Generalization
Suppose that for a feature F , there exists a series of feature values, vi,V2,... ,vi. Without generalization, every feature value Vi is regarded as a feature range with its upper and lower bounds equal to Vi. In this way, the instances in the training audit trails are represented precisely by the signatures generated from these feature ranges. Note that, for F , we have not inferred the NSA label of unknown feature subspace between any two feature values.
L I M o d e l Generalization
For every feature, to achieve LI generalization, we assume that the unknown parts in its feature space have the same NSA label as its neighboring feature values. Obviously, inherent in this assumption is a concept of distance. Therefore, due to the lack of distance concept in nominal features, we will only discuss the LI generalization on numerical (discrete and continuous) features, and regard every feature value of a nominal feature as a feature range. For convenience, we use two more notations on a feature range Kp: Upp{R^p) is its upper bound and Low{R^p) is its lower bound. With respect to a feature value Vi^ an initial feature range Kp will be formed with Upp{Rp) = Low{Kp) = vi.
LI generalization is described in algorithm 1. In this generalization, one critical step is to split the unknown subspace {vi.ViJ^i) -{Upp{Kp),Low{R^^^)) (z H-1 < /), and allocate the two parts to existing neighboring ranges R]p and R^^^. We use several strategies and evaluate them in our framework. These are: A l g o r i t h m 1 LI model generalization for a discrete/continuous feature F. (1) no splitting (2) equal splitting, (3) frequency-based splitting, (4) intrusionspecific splitting. Note that, in Algorithm 1, the merging step for feature ranges (i.e., lines 6-12) is selective after the splitting step (i.e., lines 1-5). This step for merging range is also a generahzation operation in LI generalization. 
vi.S] is assigned as L{vi), and (S.Vi^i) is assigned as L{vi-^i).
In addition, we also evaluate the merging step for every splitting strategy. In the detection phase, every instance is formalized as Sigt by replacing every value with its feature range. Finally, we evaluate whether Sigt matches any signature in i7(Fi n)-If matched, it is identified by that signature. Otherwise, Sigt will further be evaluated by L2 generalization evaluation processes.
L2 M o d e l Generalization
After the LI model generalization, all the (nominal, discrete, and/or continuous) features are uniformly represented by a series of feature ranges. In L2 model generalization, we will utilize the relations between feature ranges rather than values, which are measured by the distance of two signatures. To this end, let us first define a distance function of two signatures in the behavior models.
Signature distance. Let R{Sigi,Fi)
denote the feature range of Fi in a signature Sigi. For any two signatures, Sigi and Sig2, their distance is:
Where,^(5^,.5^,.,i^) = {;;|^^J-
Evaluating L2 generalization. L2 generalization is achieved by the following two generalization operations. L 2 . 1 : g r o u p i n g f e a t u r e r a n g e s . If several feature ranges of a feature are interchangeable in i7(Fi ^) without loss of signature distinguishabihty, they will be combined into a group. L2.2: m u t a t i n g f e a t u r e r a n g e s . For a feature, its feature range in a signature can be mutated to any of its other feature ranges without loss of signature distinguishabihty.
G r o u p i n g feature ranges.
For a feature Fi, if a feature range in i7(Fi n) is interchangeable with another feature range without loss of signature distinguishabihty (i.e. without changing its NSA label), their significance is equal to each other. We can group these feature ranges in constructing behavior models. As a special case, a feature range can form a group by itself. In this way, we can form a series of groups for F^, Gp^ = {G]^ , G^p.,...} such that for any feature range i?"^ , there is a group G^^, R^p G G^^. Finally, we achieve a grouping scheme for aU features in the feature vector:
For two signatures Sigi and Sig2 in f2{Fi n), they are equivalent to each other with respect to Gpv based on the following rule.
For any two equivalent signatures, they are compatible if they have the same NSA label. Otherwise, they are conflict to each other in the behavior models. The behavior models can be generalized by grouping feature ranges. For example, for signatures "(a, 1, E ) " and "(6, 2, F ) " , if 'a' and 'b' are grouped, the behavior models can be enlarged by two additional signatures " ( 6 , 1 , F ) " and " ( a , 2 , F ) " . Essentially, like in Genetic Algorithm [4] we are allowing crossover operation between signatures by interchanging the feature ranges in a group.
A l g o r i t h m 2 Evaluating a test signature via grouping.
Require: (1) n(Fi...n); (2) Moreover, to measure the diversity in GFVI the number of grouping points npg is utilized in the detection phase. In other words, if the grouping scheme does not exist, there are at least n -npg equivalent feature ranges betv^een Sigt and any signature Sigi in the behavior models. The larger the parameter npg is, the more diverse the group operation is. Given npg and f2{Fi ^) , a test instance is evaluated as in Algorithm 2.
If the output is an anomaly, we will evaluate Sigt using mutation operation.
M u t a t i n g feature ranges.
Neglecting some features will caiise a signature to identify more behaviors. For example, suppose that there is a signature ^^height G (156cm, 189cm], weight G (45kg, 75kg] , and Nationality = USA'\ If all three features are used, it cannot identify the instance ^height = 174cm, weight = 65kg, and Nationality = China^ will not be identified. But if ^Nationality^ is ignored, the signature will identify the instance. Essentially, ignoring features is equal to the mutation operation in Genetic Algorithms [4] . One condition of the mutation is that it should not lead to any contradiction in the existing signatures. For example, if we let Fi and F2 mutate, signatures "(a,6, c, d)" in N{Fi 4) and "(x,2/,c, d)" in A{Fi 4) will contradict to each other. Furthermore, we use a mutation point number nprn to measure the diversity of the mutation process. In the detection phase, given nprn and Q{Fi ^i), the unidentified test signature Sigt will be evaluated as in Algorithm 3. 
A l g o r i t h m 3 Evaluating a test signature via mutation.
L3 M o d e l Generalization
If the test signature Sigt cannot be identified by LI and L2 generalization, it will be identified by the signature(s) with the minimum distance to it. N e a r e s t signatures. We assume that the test signature has the same NSA label as its nearest signature(s) in the behavior models, which is measured by its minimum distance to all signatures in ^Fi...n^
M e a s u r i n g t h e D e t e c t i o n Performance
We assign a cost scheme as in Table 1 to quantify the detection performance, and calculate the average detection cost of an instance in the test audit trails. If the behavior is identified correctly, the cost is 0. Otherwise, we can assign some penalty for the detection result. In our cost scheme, we assume that the detection of an intrusion as an anomaly is useful but it is less useful than identifying an intrusion. Specifically, suppose that there are T instances in the test audit trails. Table 1 . Detection results and their costs. as: cost -#NA X 3 + #/7v x 3 + # / A X 1 X ^. In addition, the average cost in absence of any generalization gives the reference basehne, costhase, of the detection performance. In practice, the usefulness of model generalization is refiected in the relation between its average cost and costbase-If cost > costhase-, its performance has been degraded by such model generalization. Otherwise, the model generalization can be assumed to be useful for intrusion detection.
Experiments: A Case Study
We have chosen a typical dataset from KDD CUP 1999 contest [3] , which meets the requirements of our framework: labeled audit trails and an intrusion-specific feature vector, in which s^^ = 1 and £c = 0.01. In order to keep the computation within reasonable limits, we sample instances from the datasets: 10000 instances from the total 4898431 training instances and 500 instances from 311029 test instances randomly. For convincing, we give three pairs of such training and test samples. We have performed our experiments on larger samples, but the experimental results on our larger samples have the same characteristics to the results on the current samples. Table 2 lists the detection results when there is no generalization, and they are regarded as the baseline costbase-Also in this table, the 2nd and 3rd columns give the numbers of normal and intrusive instances in every sample pair. Table 2 . LO: without model generalization.
Without Model Generalization
Among the detection results, more than half of intrusive instances are identified correctly (denoted by # / / ) , but, in comparison, almost all normal instances are detected incorrectly. To some extent, it indicates that the normal behaviors are of great variety, and more generalization is needed to infer their statuses. Table 3 . L1.4 generalization on the 1st sample pair. Table 3 gives the detection performance on the 1st sample pair with L1.4 generalization, where Gin ^ {0? 1? 2,3,4, 5,10, 20}. Obviously, the value of Gin has no influence on the detection performance in all aspects. The same phenomenon is held in the other two sample pairs of our experiments as well. Thus, we let Gin = 0 in the following experiments.
Evaluating L l M o d e l Generalization
T h e utility of t h e range m e r g i n g s t e p . In Table 3 , the range merging step has contributed much to the performance enhancement by identifying more normal behaviors. Note that the range merging step has little effect on the identification ability for intrusive behaviors. Table 4 gives the evaluation results on the four scenarios of Ll generahzation. We analyze their utility for intrusion detection, and their difference. Table 4 . Ll model generalization (Ll.l~4,Gin = 0).
T h e utility of t h e u n k n o w n s u b s p a c e splitting s t e p . L l . l generalization without the range merging step is LO, which has no generalization at all.
Comparing the detection results in Table 4 and Table 2 , it is apparent that the generalization led to by the unknown subspace splitting step is useful to identify more instances, and significantly so for intrusive behaviors. Figures 2 and 3 list the evaluation results highlighting the influence of grouping and mutation operations on intrusion detection. In both figures, we only illustrate #ArA, #/A and #/Ar but the numbers of #iVAr and # / / can be deduced with ease since the total of normal and intrusive behaviors remains constant. Figure 2 , the grouping operation enhances intrusion detection, and the detection performance on the three samples have the same characteristics. Specifically, the overall detection performance improves because of a reduction in the detection cost. With the increase of nGroup, #AfA' and # / / increase while #iVA and # /^ decrease, all of which arc desirable. One negative aspect of grouping generalization is the increase of #/iv with the increase of nGroup.
Evaluating L2 Model Generalization
Fig. 2. L2 generalization-grouping (nMutate=0).
L2.1 grouping generalization. As indicated in
Overall, the gcncrahzation from the grouping mechanism is useful for intrusion detection even though it will lead to a few more false negatives. We choose nGroup = 3 in the following experiments. L2.2 mutation generalization. In Figure 3 , the improvements caused by L2.2 mutation generalization is not that significant as L2.1 or LI generalization. The decreased extent of false positives, i^NA, is neutralized by the increased extent of false negatives, #/jv. This fact is also reflected by the overall detection cost in subfigurc 3.d, which is reduced only by a very small extent. The mutation operation will further worsen the negative aspects in grouping generalization.
In our case study, the L2.2 mutation generalization is useful but it is not that significant. We select nMutate = 5 in evaluating L3 model generalization.
Evaluating L3 Model Generalization
In evaluating L3 generalization (Table 5) , nGroup = 3 and nMutate = 5. In the sample pair 1, all the normal behaviors arc identified correctly, and most intrusions are also identified correctly (88.7%=352/397). In pair 1/2/3, most normal behaviors can be identified correctly with fewer false positives (i.e., i^NA, which decreases with more generalization) after the model generalization (from LI to Table 5 . L3 generalization (nGroup=3,nMutate=5).
L3). In contrast, even though more intrusive behaviors are identified correctly as well with more generalization, the false negatives (i.e., #IN) increase to a large extent (in comparison with Table 2 ).
T h e Implications of M o d e l Generalization
In summary, model generalization is necessary for intrusion detection for identifying more behaviors correctly. The significance of every level of model generalization for intrusion detection is summarized in Table 6 . they act as an evaluation baseline to indicate whether model generalization! is necessary for intrusion detection. We also found that most intrusions are identified even without generalization. \ They improve the detection performance in our case study, significantly for intrusive behaviors. Most importantly, they lead to only a few more false negatives. Their difference are negligible. | It is very useful to infer the statuses for normal behaviors, but it contributes! less in identifying intrusive behaviors. Another good point is that it does not lead to more false negatives. | The identification capability is significantly lifted with decreasing anomalies.] However, there is an optimal value for the number of grouping points, which should be determined in advance. The identification capability is slightly lifted with decreasing anomalies. But the increase of false negatives is so large that we should neglect the increase of identification capabilities. Table 6 . The significance of different levels of model generalization. The symbol ' i ' represents 'decrease' and the symbol ' f represents 'increase'. '-' denotes that it will not affect the parameter.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we designed a formal framework to evaluate the effect of various model generalization on intrusion detection in accordance with the reasonableness of its underlying assumptions. In a case study, we apphed it to identify the implications of model generalization. We found that LI generalization is generally useful to identify more 'novel' behaviors, especially for normal behaviors. L2.1 generalization will benefit intrusion detection by significantly improving the identification capability with slight increase of false negatives. The gains and losses from applying L2.2 and L3 generalization should be considered seriously under different application scenarios.
Even though our evaluation framework is generally applied to most scenarios for intrusion detection, it should be pointed out that our conclusions are only based on our case study on a typical dataset for intrusion detection. Our further work is to collect datasets to further evaluate the utility of model generalization in other areas, such as bioinformatics.
